For-Profit Education?

In the United States, a recent phenomenon in higher education has gained steam – the increasing number of for-profit colleges/universities. Typically, universities are state-subsidized institutions or private non-profit institutions. As such, the traditional university is not centrally driven on the supposition of making money; instead education remains the centrepiece of the university, where students and staff produce and disseminate knowledge.

Under the growing for-profit, private enterprise model, universities are emerging that are characterized by a number of values that are antithetical to educational excellence:

• A desire to enrol as many students as possible
• Targeting of under-prepared young people from low-income communities who will rely on expensive federal student loans
• An increasing number of courses offered online without in-person instruction, tutoring or assistance
• A standardization of curriculum, overseen by university management
  

In essence, this model of education is comparable to fast-food restaurants, with one key caveat. At a fast-food restaurant like McDonalds for example, a Big Mac is relatively cheap and produced the exact same way at virtually any McDonalds across the globe. Its production is standardized, available for anyone to purchase who has a fairly small amount of money.

Likewise at for-profit colleges/universities, education is readily available to anyone who can pay, who has online computer access, and who is willing to receive a standardized education that is exactly the same, irrespective of the instructor or campus location. The caveat is that unlike a Big Mac at McDonalds, tuition at for-profit colleges/universities is quite expensive relative to traditional universities.

These conditions at for-profit educational institutions are established and enforced by institutional management. I have friends and colleagues who have taught at some of these institutions. They have told me that the textbooks and PowerPoint lectures they use are set ahead of time by the management, and that a managerial assessor is present in their classroom to insure that they are not deviating from the set curriculum.

This rigid and policed educational model is one that has three critical ramifications. One, the degrees students attain (if they attain them) are not valued in society. Thus, if a student graduates, s/he exits the university often times with a massive student debt and near worthless degree. Two, innovation is completely stifled. University staff and students are not encouraged to creatively investigate the many dimensions of our local and global communities. A uniform “cookie cutter” curricula devalues innovation and the production of knowledge through research, something no university should desire.

Three, the strict managerial surveillance of university staff discourages dissent, both of the curricula and of anything happening in society at large. Obviously, this is a crucial problem, as historically universities have been vital stimulators of social movements against oppressive conditions in society. The for-profit model of education eradicates all modes of a collective critical consciousness; students and staff are denied academic freedom and freedom of expression.

So what does all this have to do with the University of Auckland? Nobody is suggesting our university be completely transformed into a for-profit institution, are they? Probably not. However, it is absolutely essential that our university does not move in the direction of the for-profit model where management makes unobstructed universal decisions, rendering staff and students completely powerless in the university’s daily operations. As we see student tuition and debt rise, while our university’s international ranking simultaneously goes down, it is imperative that we at least make connections and ask the relevant questions.

There is no reason that university management should be privileged to such a degree that staff and students are excluded from major decision making processes. The for-profit model values students as dollars and staff as static informational cogs. Is the University of Auckland moving towards the for-profit model? If so, we need to turn things around now as this would certainly not be in the students’ best interests.

See also here: For-Profit Colleges: Targeting People Who Can't Pay


blog

The University Is Me

So I've walked into an interesting situation at The University of Auckland. The main concern for me is that if my research time is limited, I will have less official time to work with communities in preventing violence and building social capital. Research can be community-oriented and driven; it should be valued as an opportunity for universities to connect with the broader community in mutually beneficial ways.

I don't want my research time cut, specifically because doing so further separates me and my colleagues from non-academic community mobilizers.



Please do whatever little bit you can to support out rights as academicians with academic freedom. Protecting our worker rights will benefit the entire university, including students, as well as the broader New Zealand and global community.

Mixed Martial Arts Salaries: A Look at Their Disproportionate Growth in the UFC

Article cross-posted at BloodyElbow.com

Introduction

Since World War II, the face of American big business has changed dramatically. In the 1950s and ‘60s, chief executive officers of successful companies obviously made substantially more than their employees. At that time, CEOs made roughly 25 to 30 times what their average employee made. In the 1980s, big business practices changed. Factories were being moved overseas to capitalize on cheaper labor sources while government under the Reagan Administration infringed less and less on big business practices.

In 1980, the CEO of a major company made about 40 times that of an average employee. By 1990, the ratio rose to 100 times. In 2007, a typical CEO of a major company made 350 times the average company worker. Wal-Mart exemplifies this shifting trend in business relationships vividly. It was the largest U.S. company in 2005, and at that time, Wal-Mart’s CEO made 900 times that of the average Wal-Mart worker (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2011).

Forty, fifty years ago, CEOs were more compelled to maintain positive relationships with their employees and adhere to tighter governmental oversights. Employees also had stronger collective bargaining rights and better relationships with management. Today, management and owners maintain distance from employees through protective legal mechanisms and worker disposability that together, limit workers’ efforts to unite in fighting for fair pay, health care, retirement, education, and other potential benefits.

So what does all this have to do with mixed martial arts?

In 2001, Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta paid $2 million to purchase the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC). It is common knowledge that the two brothers lost $44 million in their UFC investment from 2001 to 2004. But in April 2008, Forbes magazine reported that the UFC had skyrocketed in value to $1 billion. Assuming these figures are correct, then in seven years the UFC’s value increased nearly 50,000%. No, that is not a typo.

As stated from the 2008 Forbes article:

The majority of UFC revenues come from the monthly pay-per-view events. Additional cash is made from ticket sales to live fights and licensing fees from its Spike cable shows The Ultimate Fighter and UFC Fight Night. These shows in turn act as promotional tools to drive fans to pay-per-view events. More scratch comes from sales of DVDs and T shirts, as well as downloads from UFC’s library of past bouts.

In 2008, the UFC “generated a over a quarter of a billion dollars in business in gate receipts, UFC merchandise, and licensing fees” (Lim et al., 2010, p. 50).

At present it is difficult to say how much the Fertitta brothers make specifically from the UFC on an annual basis. For what it is worth, “Celebrity Net Worth” currently lists Lorenzo Fertitta's net value at $1 billion, though this would stem from much more than the UFC. And while the Fertitta brothers each own 45% of the UFC, the remaining 10% is owned by the company’s President and public face, Dana White, who is reportedly worth approximately $150 million.

Again, it is difficult, possibly impossible, to know what the three UFC owners make on an annual basis, or what percentage they each net from the UFC’s various revenue sources. But it is probably safe to say, they are making a substantial amount. Many would argue they deserve it – they had the vision and took the risks to build the UFC. They have persevered and profited under the capitalist system.

And so have some of their workers…

As noted in the prior piece in this series of essays, Georges St. Pierre made $8,000 in a winning effort at UFC 48; today a GSP win yields the current welterweight champ $400,000 – a 4,900% increase. Back in 2007 when Rashad Evans fought Tito Ortiz to a draw, he made $16,000; more recently after defeating “Rampage” Jackson, Evans was rewarded with $435,000 – a 2,618% increase. Clearly, as a UFC fighter’s star power rises, so can his salary. However, this is not necessarily the optimal way to analyze UFC fighters’ salaries over time.

Methodology

A more detailed description of the methods for this piece can be found here. In short, to collect data for this project, the available information was gathered from MMA websites for each fighter's publicly stated earned income from UFC 100 to UFC 127. Only major fight cards were examined for this project, essentially meaning cards that were held on a pay-per-view basis.

For this sample, a total of 15 fight cards were examined, in which 326 payouts (also known as a fighter's "purse") were made to fighters; fighter salaries for 13 UFC fight cards during this timeframe could not be located. These payouts will be referred to as the “Post-UFC Boom Payouts.” Additionally for comparative purposes, 100 payouts were examined from UFC 44, UFC 46, UFC 47, UFC 48, UFC 49, and UFC 51, fight cards that took place from 2003 to 2005, just before the UFC turned the corner and began making major profits. Data for these earlier payouts were gathered from a blog managed by Ivan Trembow (here, here, and here). These payouts will be referred to as the “Pre-UFC Boom Payouts.”

There are a few important limitations to these methods. First, the public compensation made to fighters within the UFC promotion does not include "backstage/locker room" bonuses that are given to select fighters by management (as noted by commenters in the first article using this data set). Nor does the data set include possible royalties that elite fighters may secure from pay-per-view buys, DVD sales, etc. (which would expand the stratification among fighters since middle and lower-tier fighters would likely not secure such compensation).

Findings and Discussion

Pre-UFC Boom Payouts (N = 100):
• Mean: $29,180
• Median: $8,000 (best measure)
• Standard deviation: $46,726

Post-UFC Boom Payouts (N = 326):
• Mean: $66,012
• Median: $27,000 (best measure)
• Standard deviation: $92,164

It is worth reiterating that the standard deviation (general dispersion from the mean) in both these cases is extremely large, demonstrating the massive inequality in payouts among fighters. Furthermore, the standard deviation has expanded substantially over time, nearly doubling from the pre-boom to post-boom years, which is attributed heavily to pay increases among the UFC’s top stars, coupled with very modest increases for prelim fighters.

A comparison of the means is statistically significant at .001, indicating a highly significant boost in fighters’ average pay over the years. However, the best measure when examining average income is the median, and clearly the median pay for UFC fighters has risen substantially, up from $8,000 in the pre-boom years to $27,000 in the post-boom years, a 237% increase.

The pay distribution between the two samples was also made, dividing each sample into rough quartiles:

Pre-UFC Boom:
* Highest paid 25%: $30,000-$225,000 (n=25)
* 2nd highest paid 25%: $10,000-$23,000 (n=19)
* 3rd highest paid 25%: $5,000-$8,000 (n=26)
* Lowest paid 25%: $2,000-$4,000 (n=30)

Post-UFC Boom:
* Highest paid 25%: $83,000-$500,000 (n=82)
* 2nd highest paid 25%: $27,000-$81,000 (n=82)
* 3rd highest paid 25%: $13,000-$26,000 (n=78)
* Lowest paid 25%: $3,000-$12,000 (n=84)

As would be expected, within each quartile fighters make considerably more in the post-UFC boom years. The top earner in the pre-UFC boom sample was Randy Couture, who earned $225,000 ($150,000 to show; $75,000 to win) at UFC 49. Couture’s top earnings at UFC 49 were less than half of what Chuck Liddell and James Toney made ($500,000) in losing efforts at UFC 118 and 115, respectively.

But even in the earlier UFC sample, status was a critical factor that increased fighter pay. Tito Ortiz earned three out of the top ten purses in the “pre-boom” sample, losing twice and both times earning $125,000. Within the lower quartile of the earlier sample, a few fighters were represented who still compete now and have heavily improved their name recognition (e.g., Chris Lytle, Josh Thompson, Jorge Rivera, Nick Diaz). However, most fighters in the lower quartile have not been active in the UFC the past two years.

The decreased activity of many fighters in the lowest quartile of the “pre- boom” sample is significant because it could suggest what will occur among the larger number of lower-tier fighters on the current UFC roster. As the global market of fighters expands, the lower-tier fighters become more expendable. Their work status is increasingly precarious in an occupation that is already erratic due to the sport’s highly physical nature.

In fact, looking at the lowest quartile of the “pre-boom” era, there were 27 fighters represented (for 30 payouts). Of these 27 fighters, only 8 had competed in the UFC in the last two years (roughly 30%), though a few of these fighters who had not recently competed in the UFC were competing in high profile matches elsewhere (e.g., Nick Diaz). Most fighters in the lower quartile remained active; 21 out of 27 had fought in either the UFC or another organization within the last 2 years, while 9 had not competed at all since April 2009.

This may not be terribly surprising – these are typically the UFC prelim fighters getting a first or second opportunity on a UFC pay-per-view card, or the aging veterans lucky enough to be given an extra chance. As time goes by, the less talented pool fades out. Under the fight game’s structure, they are replaced by younger, more talented prospects. And the callous, business-oriented perspective argues high monetary compensation is not these lower-tier fighters’ reward. Rather, they were given the opportunity, and they washed out of the sport's top organization.

For all the rhetoric among some fans and pundits who suggest fighters should be grateful for simply having an opportunity with the UFC, critics must also consider an average pro-MMA fighter’s “fighting life.” If fighting and training others is a full time job, this leaves minimal time for developing additional occupational skills, despite the fact that virtually all fighters will have a significant amount of years to live after their professional fight skills have diminished.

Although fighter purses have risen substantially, their growth is hardly commensurate with the UFC’s increased value during the same general timeframe. As one BloodyElbow commenter stated in response to lower-tier fighters’ precarious position in the UFC:

Another thing is that over time, although fighter pay has steadily increased, the amount of money the UFC makes has risen enormously. The fighter’s piece of the pie has become much smaller, and therein lies the issue. If you kept the percentage of revenue allocated towards fighter’s pay the same as it was a few years ago, then the stars would be making true star money, and the lower level guys would be making more than 3 grand a fight. That’s where the REAL money is, not in the “_ of the Night” bonuses.

Thus, when Randy Couture discusses a fighters’ union, health insurance, retirement plans, and education, people should listen and do so seriously. For health insurance, fighters are covered for injuries that happen in the Octagon on fight night only. Is it completely implausible to make health insurance available once a fight contract is signed, at which time the fighter is training specifically for a UFC fight card? Additionally, more substantial increases for fighters’ purses – at all levels, but especially the lower levels – are warranted. The UFC has grown immensely, and for that, many people are grateful, including many fans. Why not raise the fighters’ compensation at a more proportionate rate? Ultimately, they are the reason fans keep coming to watch.

Non-internet References:

Lim, C. H., Martin, T. G., & Kwak, D. H. (2010). Examining television consumers of mixed martial arts: the relationship among risk taking, emotion, attitude, and actual sport-media-consumption behavior. International Journal of Sport Communication, 3, 49-63.

Pickett, K., & Wilkinson, R. (2011). Preface to The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality makes Societies Stronger by Robert Reich. New York: Bloomsbury Press.


academics blogs

The Mixed Martial Arts Precariat: A Critique of Excitement Incentive Bonuses

Introduction

This is the third entry in a series examining fighter salaries from the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) and Strikeforce prior to Zuffa’s takeover of the latter promotion. More specifically, this series has illustrated how social stratification – inequality based on wealth, power, and prestige – is rampant among MMA fighters, both men and women. The present article will focus solely on the UFC, looking specifically at how fighter bonuses extend the precarious nature of the athletes’ livelihood.

Methodology

A more detailed description of the methods for this piece can be found here. In short, to collect data for this project, the available information was gathered from MMA websites for each fighter's publicly stated earned income from UFC 100 to UFC 127. Only major fight cards were examined for this project, essentially meaning cards that were held on a pay-per-view basis.

For this sample, a total of 15 fight cards were examined, in which 326 payouts (also known as a fighter's "purse") were made to fighters; fighter salaries for 13 UFC fight cards during this timeframe could not be located.

There are a few important limitations to these methods. First, the public compensation made to fighters within the UFC promotion does not include "backstage/locker room" bonuses that are given to select fighters by management (as noted by commenters in the first article using this data set). Nor does the data set include possible royalties that elite fighters may secure from pay-per-view buys, DVD sales, etc. (which would expand the stratification among fighters since middle and lower-tier fighters would likely not secure such compensation).

Findings

Fighter "excitement incentive bonuses" refer to the "X of the Night" bonuses fighters receive on each UFC fight card. These bonuses are typically awarded to four competitors: for "Fight of the Night" (given to both the winning and losing fighter in the card’s most exciting match), "Submission of the Night" (given to a fighter who wins via the most impressive submission on the card), and "Knockout of the Night" (given to a fighter who wins via the most spectacular knockout on the card).

All of these excitement incentive bonuses come in the form of supplementary income to the fighter’s guaranteed purse (i.e., "show" money), his possible win bonus, and on rare occasion are given to more than one fighter (e.g., sometimes two fighters may be given monetary awards for "Knockout of the Night"). A fighter may also "double up" on these awards; for instance at UFC 106, Josh Koscheck earned a guaranteed $53,000 to show, $53,000 to win, $70,000 for "Submission of the Night," and $70,000 for "Fight of the Night," thereby securing a total purse of $246,000. Among the sample examined in this study, these excitement incentive bonuses ranged in monetary value from $50,000 (given to awardees at UFC 108) to $100,000 (given to awardees at UFC 100).

Again, a total of 326 UFC payouts were examined. Of these 326 payouts, 57 (17.5%) included excitement incentive bonuses, and 269 (82.5%) had none of these bonus types. Contrasts were first made examining the 57 cases, comparing the fighters’ purses including these excitement incentive bonuses versus their purses had they hypothetically not received these bonuses.

Fighter Purses with Excitement Incentive Bonuses (N = 57)

• Mean: $147,477


• Median: $112,000


• Standard deviation: $92,570

Fighter Purses with Excitement Incentive Bonuses Subtracted (N = 57)

• Mean: $74,175


• Median: $36,000


• Standard deviation: $89,028

One can see rather clearly the abundant impact these excitement incentive bonuses have on fighters’ purses, nearly doubling the mean, and increasing the median (the best measure here) more than three times. Obviously for these fighters, the supplementary income is a significant reward. However, these data only present part of the information.

It is also important to compare the 57 fighters’ purses with the excitement incentive bonuses subtracted versus the 269 fighter purses in which none of these bonuses were given, presented, below:

Fighter Purses with Excitement Incentive Bonuses Subtracted (N = 57)

• Mean: $74,175


• Median: $36,000


• Standard deviation: $89,028

Fighter Purses, Never Received Excitement Incentive Bonuses (N = 269)

• Mean: $48,750


• Median: $20,000


• Standard deviation: $82,460

The key comparison here is that the median for fighters who received the excitement incentive bonuses stands at $36,000. Recall, that is the median value before their excitement incentive bonuses were included in analyses. In contrast, the median for those who never received the bonuses is only $20,000.

This discrepancy reflects two things. First and foremost, those who receive these bonuses are more often winners of matches (a relatively obvious point), who are therefore not only receiving these bonuses, but also in most cases a win bonus (unless they were losers who received a "Fight of the Night" bonus). Additionally, the discrepancy shows that a disproportionate number of fighters receiving these excitement incentive bonuses already have high status and can leverage better contracts should they not secure a supplemental bonus.

In short, the excitement incentive bonuses extend the inequality among fighters. It is far more common to see fighters with high profile names, still in top-tier competitive form who already make substantial incomes earning the excitement incentive bonuses (e.g., Dan Henderson, Anderson Silva, Jon Jones, Chris Leben, Rich Franklin). Conversely, aging fighters and those who are greener, who typically make less money, are less likely to receive these bonuses (e.g., Frank Trigg, David Loiseau, Goran Reljic, Todd Brown).

Of course since only 17% of the payouts in this sample included these particular bonus types, numerous fighters who compete in main events or co-main events do not receive them. However, these fighters are already making healthy incomes (e.g., Vitor Belfort earned $275,000 in a losing effort with no bonuses at UFC 126).

Fighter Bonuses and the Precariat

Given these trends, it is important to consider the necessity of these excitement incentive bonuses, as well as how these particular bonuses increase fighters’ risks. Bear in mind, incentive bonuses already exist – win bonuses. Many argue that without further bonuses that encourage athletes to finish fights in exciting fashion via either submission or knockout, too many fighters will compete simply to win, opting for the safer routes to victory that lack entertainment value.

Such a perspective leans towards treating MMA as spectacle over sport. Many have argued sports in general continuously move in this direction, away from traditional sporting notions (e.g., winning yields the greatest rewards) towards a form of entertainment for fan pleasure. Hence, NFL owners push for a longer regular season that benefits them and the fans, not the athletes.

Furthermore, these particular incentive bonuses disproportionately encourage the lower-tier and poorer fighters to utilize risky fighting styles that resonate with fans who call for increased violence over winning. As early as 2007, Greg Downey stated:

"Promoters encourage fighters to use striking strategies because they are perceived to be more popular with fans. A public relations executive at Zuffa explained to me that, if a fighter put on a ‘good show’ – he was aggressive and exciting to watch – he would be invited back even if he lost" (p. 216).

While bonuses are given for "Submission of the Night," the general tenet expressed by Downey holds true across today’s MMA landscape. Chris Lytle and Leonard Garcia truly exemplify this perspective, both holding long tenures under the Zuffa banner arguably because of their risky approaches to competition. Jon Fitch and Antonio McKee, on the other hand, not only win extensively over very long periods, but win in ways that safeguard their physical and mental health. Thus despite winning extensively over the years, the latter two fighters have not been rewarded in ways that are commensurate with their records.

Up and coming less known fighters and aging out veterans are both groups of fighters looking to build or re-build their names. And they are more commonly in need of hefty monetary bonuses. These are the groups of fighters Guy Standing would refer to as part of the MMA "precariat."

They are part of the vulnerable, expendable working class, or "proletariat," but in this case, their income and work status is constantly precarious. Should they get a contract with the UFC and make it to the scheduled competition, they secure their "show" money, which is typically quite low. Their win bonus is not guaranteed, and would probably double their purse. But gaining an excitement incentive bonus may literally increase their purse six times and improve their chances of future employment. Hence, their financial vulnerability in a precarious market calls for increased risks – risks to winning and to their health.

The more one company commands control of a global industry, the less power workers have to advocate for their rights. Lower-tier fighters’ precarious employment is further threatened by the UFC’s dominance in the global market, where mixed martial artists from different parts of Asia, South America, North America, Europe, and the Pacific vie for a chance to compete and make the highlight reel on the grandest MMA stage.

A hallmark fighter like the current Georges St. Pierre (GSP) can afford financially to not take risks, and may even view risks in competition as jeopardizing his current income and sporting legacy. It is fiscally prudent for a "name" fighter like St. Pierre to fight safe. The complete opposite is true for mixed martial artists who fall in the lowest tiers of a stratified MMA global market.

This means fighters like the current GSP, Randy Couture, and "Rampage" Jackson must remember where they came from, as well as their peers from the 1990s and early 2000s who never made it the elite levels and reaped lucrative financial rewards. Today, GSP makes $400,000 (half to show; half to win) on a typical fight card. In a winning effort at UFC 48 he made $8,000. Will these fighters who currently have power ever make lasting efforts to advocate for their fellow and future workers?

Much more importantly, will administration and ownership consider how incentive bonuses jeopardize their employees? It is hardly outlandish to argue lower-tier fighters are rendered disposable and replaceable across the global market. These particular fighters know they have very limited life chances to impress the brass, and the brass knows the fighters are aware of their own uncertain circumstances.

Rewarding lower-tier fighters would not take much organizational change. On a typical UFC pay-per-view fight card, there are 11 matches with 22 fighters. If excitement incentive bonuses are set at $75,000 a piece, that is $300,000 usually distributed to four fighters. If these excitement incentive bonuses were decreased to $20,000 a piece (still a significant amount of money for lower- and mid-tier fighters), that would leave $220,000 to distribute across the fight night roster. If distributed evenly to just ten of the lowest paid fighters, each would receive an extra $22,000 in guaranteed income.

When I interviewed Guy Mezger years ago, he told me, "…to be honest man, most of the guys, a lot of the guys, they think there’s a huge amount of money in this sport, and there is, for a very small amount of people." Mezger was and still is right – the wealth is there, but not for everyone. If they truly care about all their employees, White, Fertitta and company can and should do a better job of spreading it around.

Up next: how the UFC as a company has skyrocketed in value while fighter salaries lag behind in proportionate growth.

Non-internet Source:

Downey, G. (2007). Producing pain: techniques and technologies in no-holds-barred fighting. Social Studies of Science, 37 (2), 201-226.


academics blogs

Social Stratification in Mixed Martial Arts

Introduction

In March 2011, the Ultimate Fighting Championship’s (UFC) parent company – Zuffa L.L.C. – purchased the UFC’s primary and only serious MMA promotional competitor – Strikeforce. In doing so, some have argued Zuffa L.L.C. has cornered the major MMA market. By essentially eliminating the competition, high-level MMA fighters are now deprived of options where they make take their talents and leverage their individual worth. As the MMA industry in the United States (and to a large degree globally) currently stands, only those promotions under the Zuffa banner can pay fighters a substantial amount of money for participating in a fairly dangerous line of work.

This article will be the first in a series that examines a sample of fighters’ salaries from both the UFC and Strikeforce promotions as a means of analyzing the industry before the merger.

Social Stratification

Social stratification is a sociological concept suggesting that society is divided into different layers based on wealth, power, and prestige. Wealth includes the amount of resources an individual or group holds; this includes financial resources and social networks that can provide access to resources. Power is defined as the ability to influence one’s own life and the lives of others. Prestige refers to the degree of status one (or a group) holds in society (e.g., popularity, respect).

These three components, of course, impact one another. A group with extensive wealth tends to have more power in influencing other groups. If one has a low level of prestige, he or she will have less life chances to acquire a substantial amount of wealth. A group with very little power will have a difficult time advocating for greater rights and resources.

Within the MMA industry, those with the most wealth, power, and prestige are typically promotional owners. They stand at the top of the socially stratified MMA world. As noted previously, however, the number of major MMA promotions across the global landscape is extremely small. Thus one may argue that as the number of major MMA promotions decreases (or fall under the same management), the owners of the large MMA promotions increase their wealth, power, and prestige.

MMA fighters in contrast, generally have less wealth, power, and prestige than owners. Moreover, there are stratified levels of wealth, power, and prestige among the fighters. Certain fighters are more connected to the owners than others, are more (or less) popular with the fans, and may have better (or less) resources at their disposal (e.g., an effective agent or manager).

The prestige and resources a fighter has impacts the amount of income one can push for on a contract. An important resource for a fighter is also his or her record. Ostensibly, a lengthy winning record over quality opponents helps leverage more money promised for competing in an MMA fight, assuming the fighter is still in competitive form.

It is a common perception that MMA fighters who make it to the “big time,” either having competed in the UFC or Strikeforce promotion, make a substantial income. MMA fighters, however, only compete at most four times per year, and it is far more likely that they compete roughly twice per year.

A fighter’s number of competitions each year is contingent upon numerous variables. A loss may lead to being released from a promotional contract. It is not uncommon for fighters to be injured in practice and then need to drop out of a fight. Fighters may have personal and/or occupational disagreements with promotional management that influences fights booked (or more likely, not booked). In short, if a fighter sits within a low level of the stratified MMA industry, he or she may get minimal fights per year.

Additionally, fighters’ purses vary immensely, which will be the focus of this article.

Methodology

MMA fighters do not have collective bargaining rights; they lack collective, organized power. Consequently, MMA promotions are not always required to release fighters’ salaries to the public after competition. However, commissions in some states require MMA promotions to make fighters’ salaries public. When this occurs, MMA websites typically report the information.

To collect data for this project, the available information was gathered from MMA websites for each fighter’s publicly stated earned income from UFC 100 to UFC 127, as well as a sample of Strikeforce fighters’ salaries who competed within the timeframe. Only major fight cards were examined for this project, essentially meaning cards that were held on a pay-per-view basis. As noted previously, following UFC 127, Zuffa L.L.C. purchased the Strikeforce promotion, thereby putting the UFC and Strikeforce under the same ownership banner.

For the UFC promotion, a sample of 15 fight cards were examined, in which 326 payouts (also known as a fighter’s “purse”) were made to fighters; fighter salaries for 13 UFC fight cards during this timeframe could not be located. For the Strikeforce promotion, a sample of 8 fight cards were examined, with 156 payouts. For Strikeforce, two payouts were discarded from the analysis (one in which the majority of the payout was reportedly given to charity and second of which was paid in advance of the competition), rendering this portion of the sample to 154.

Within the overall sample, a number of fighters competed more than once. For instance, Cris “Cyborg” Santos competed on four out of the eight Strikeforce cards examined; all four of her payouts were included and each was counted separately within the overall sample. Likewise as an example in the UFC, Brock Lesnar competed on three fight cards, and all three of his payouts were examined separately. The nine women’s matches were only in the Strikeforce promotion. Thus for women’s matches, there were a total of 18 payouts to female fighters; there were 462 payouts to male fighters, for a final sample of 480 payouts (N = 480).

Documentation was made if fighters won or lost their matches, and if a fighter won his/her match and was given a win bonus, what that bonus was in a dollar amount. For instance, in one match Fabricio Werdum was given $25,000 to “show” (i.e., compete), and since he won his match, he earned an additional “win bonus” of $25,000 for a total of $50,000. The $50,000 was the amount counted in the final analysis. The ratio of a win bonus relative to the “show” figure can fluctuate depending on each individual fighter’s ability to leverage a contract with the promotion. Chuck Liddell, one of the most popular MMA stars for instance, leveraged a flat rate of $500,000 to compete without any possible win bonus. Thus, even in losing his match, he still earned $500,000.

Finally within the UFC sample, “incentive” bonuses were documented. On each UFC fight card, a “Knockout of the Night” bonus is given to one fighter, a “Submission of the Night” bonus is given to one fighter, and a “Fight of the Night” bonus is given to two fighters. These incentive bonuses ranged from $50,000 to $100,000. The final value counted for each UFC fighter payout included incentive bonuses when applicable. On one card for example, Yoshihiro Akiyama received $40,000 to “show,” $20,000 to win, and $100,000 for “Fight of the Night,” earning him a grand total of $160,000 (the amount counted in analyses). Since he earned “Fight of the Night” by beating Alan Belcher, Belcher received his $19,000 “show” money and an additional $100,000 for also being in the “Fight of the Night.” Belcher’s $119,000 was likewise the amount counted in analyses.

Results

The sample of payouts ranged from $500,000 at the top to $940 at the bottom. Interestingly, the two fighters who both earned $500,000 for one fight both lost. James Toney (a boxer turned MMA fighter for 1 competition to date) earned the top purse after losing to Randy Couture at UFC 118 via a round one submission; for beating Toney, Couture earned $250,000 (flat rate with no win bonus). Chuck Liddell lost at UFC 115 by second round knockout to Rich Franklin; Franklin earned $225,000 ($70,000 to show, $70,000 to win, and $85,000 for “Knockout of the Night”). The lowest purse of $940 was also given to two fighters, but within the Strikeforce promotion.

The following figures display the measures of central tendency and variance for the total sample and two separate promotions:

Total Sample (N = 480):

• Mean: $52,703
• Median: $20,000
• Standard Deviation: $84,307

UFC Sample (N = 326)

• Mean: $66,012
• Median: $27,000
• Standard Deviation: $92,164

Strikeforce Sample (N = 154)

• Mean: $24,528
• Median: $4,500
• Standard Deviation: $55,068

When examining data related to income, the mean (mathematical average) is frequently a deceiving measure because it is skewed by outliers, such as the $500,000 payouts to Toney and Liddell. Thus, the mean figures for all three samples, while informative, do not offer the best measure that typifies MMA fighters’ purses.

In fact, the standard deviation is an indication of how widely the cases in each sample are dispersed from the mean. Because the standard deviation is large for each sample, we can say with greater clarity that the mean does not accurately represent on average what MMA fighters in these promotions earn.

A better indicator of average income data is the median, which stood at $20,000 for the total sample, $27,000 for the UFC sample, and $4,500 for the Strikeforce sample. Obviously, by examining any measure, one can see that UFC fighters tend to earn more income than Strikeforce fighters, and this difference is statistically significant at the .001 level (which is highly significant).

Perhaps, however, a more interesting analysis of this data entails examining how many fighters fall into different brackets of income level per fight. The following numbers represent the number of fighters earning purses within six income brackets:

• 82 cases (roughly one sixth of the sample) earned $90,000 or more per fight
• 80 cases in the sample earned between $38,000 and $89,000
• 83 cases in the sample earned between $20,000 and $36,000
• 66 cases in the sample earned between $11,000 – $19,800
• 94 cases in the sample earned between $4,000 and $10,000
• 75 cases in the sample earned $3,940 or less

To put this into perspective, 35.2% of the cases in the sample earned $10,000 or less per fight; 15.6% of the sample earned $4,000 or less per fight. On the other end of the extreme, 17.1% of the sample earned $90,000 or more per fight. Only 34 cases (7.1% of the sample) earned $200,000 or more per fight.

Discussion

Within the MMA industry, status clearly plays a major role in fighters’ ability to leverage resources. James Toney is a professional athlete with an extensive professional boxing history, but who had literally no professional MMA experience. Yet, his boxing status enabled him to leverage a $500,000 payday despite losing very decisively to Randy Couture.

One then must ask, did Toney’s mere participation on a pay-per-view MMA competition yield significantly increased pay-per-view buys? If not, this certainly calls into question the fairness of Toney earning so much to lose so decisively when other, more capable and experienced MMA fighters produce more competitive fights.

These data also dispel any assumptions that most MMA fighters earn lucrative incomes as professional athletes. While it is true, most MMA fighters augment their competition purses with income through teaching combat sport classes and possibly by securing sponsorships, that supplementary income is not especially large, in particular for those fighters who do not have high status.

Furthermore, following competitions when fighters have received their purse money, they typically must distribute portions of it to their trainers, nutritionists, cornermen, and whoever else helped them prepare for the competition. One can see how fast the purse money would disintegrate if a fighter earned $10,000 or less for a competition (recall, that is approximately one third of the entire sample).

It is not terribly surprising that MMA fighters do not have collective bargaining rights, given that the sport is still less than two decades old. However, it is somewhat surprising that MMA fighters are not taking initial steps to organize so that they may secure collective rights in the near future.

As the situation currently stands, fighters are essentially at odds with one another in what is known as a “split labor market,” where those who rely on their bodies as labor within a capitalist system compete with each other to assert their value. This is commonly seen as a “divide and conquer” system that privileges management over workers.

The next series of articles relying on this data set will examine female fighters’ earned income relative to males’, as well as the impact incentive bonuses have within the UFC sample.

Photo via BloodyElbow.com.


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Mixed Martial Arts, Fighters Rights, and an Enforced Muhammad Ali Act?

For those who believe that a society and all its components are best understood through its economic system, we need to examine external regulation if we are to understand and predict future worker-employer relationships. This is true for any industry, sporting or otherwise, including mixed martial arts (MMA).

Those familiar with combat sports history know that boxing is among the most corrupt sports in the modern era. While all sports include dimensions of constructed spectacle, boxing’s track record in manipulating theatrical drama is particularly bothersome. The backdrop to boxing mega-fights, dramatized press conferences and other pre-fight hype includes a plethora of unknown, underpaid fighters, sacrificed in manufactured mismatches that build prospects’ reputations.

As a combat sport promoted through gladiator type pageantry, MMA inevitably follows a good portion of boxing’s promotional structure. Fighters typically build their reputation at the local level in smaller shows, working their way through modest paydays in organizations that have varying levels of oversight. The sacrifices of today are deemed worthwhile in hopes that financial dreams are realized in a larger organization tomorrow. As noted previously, these hopes and dreams are rarely met, and the stories of unknown fighters remain, unknown.

The process for every fighter is long and arduous – physically taxing on one’s body, emotions, pocketbook, and social network. In working through the process, fighters incessantly go through what Spencer (2009) calls “body callusing” – “whereby the fighter takes his/her body as a site of action and aggressively seeks…to harden the body and turn it into a weapon” (p. 127) that can distribute and endure pain.

Because MMA has been institutionalized for under two decades, we are still unable to tell the long-term health effects its training and competitions have on participants. But considering MMA’s physical demands, it is appropriate to ask how fighters will be protected in the years to come by external regulating bodies, if they are protected at all.

Federal Regulation or Not?

Central to this issue is whether or not industries should be regulated by the free market, states, or federal government. Under the Reagan-Bush era, governmental regulation was defined as a hindrance to individual rights and private enterprise. Essentially, this political ideology professed that entrepreneurs, their innovation and business drive should not be stymied by oppressive federal oversight. The flip side to this political paradigm is that an unbridled free market without regulation fuels brutal business practices where business owners act dishonorably, exploiting labor as they market their product.

With regard to MMA, regulation in the United States materializes on a state by state basis. This was accomplished first in 2000 in New Jersey, just before Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta and Dana White took over the helm of the Ultimate Fighting Championship (UFC) in 2001. Since then, the UFC has actively sought regulation, serving as MMA’s principle lobbyists across the United States and selected cities beyond U.S. borders.

A key topic in the push for regulation is fighter safety, more specifically, how the “Unified Rules of Mixed Martial Arts Combat” minimize major sporting injuries. This is one of two publicly debated issues (the other being the glorification of violence). Lost in the public discourse, however, is how regulation protects fighters’ financial interests.

Maher (2010) provides a few notable examples rarely discussed across the MMA media landscape. California, for instance, does not allow individuals who have been licensed within the MMA industry within the past two years to serve on its athletic commission, thereby deterring conflicts of interests between commission members and private MMA organizations. Nevada’s commission requires a “bout agreement” in advance of matches which insures that fighters are compensated their promised purse (i.e., payment).

“Deal content,” or compensation, on the other hand, is currently not regulated. Thus, fighter pay is essentially determined by each individual fighter’s bargaining power, which is contingent upon his/her fight record, management team, and especially public notoriety. In short, there is very little, if anything, in the way of state regulation that assists fighters in advocating for what they may define as fair pay and other occupational rights (e.g., broad-based health insurance). Federally, occupational rights specific to MMA are non-existent.

Bolstering Regulation Via a Federally Enforced Muhammad Ali Act

As stated by Varney (2009), Congress passed the Professional Boxing Safety Act (“Safety Act”) into law in 1996 to help clean up the sport while providing federal oversight. The act requires that (1) all boxing matches are supervised by state athletic commissions; (2) all boxers go through a physical examination by a certified physician to determine his/her physical fitness; (3) an ambulance and/or medics with proper medical equipment be on sight; and (4) a physician be present at ringside.

The Safety Act clearly has a focus on physical safety and is more or less mimicked in the MMA industry. The Safety Act, however, does not address in any way the potential financial exploitation of fighters. Thus, the Safety Act was augmented in 2000 with the Muhammad Ali Act (“Ali Act”), which calls:

• To protect the rights and welfare of professional boxers on an interstate basis by preventing certain exploitative, oppressive, and unethical business practices;


• To assist State boxing commissions in their efforts to provide more effective public oversight of the sport; and


• To promote honorable competition in professional boxing and enhance the overall integrity of the industry (Varney, 2009, p. 288).

Perhaps most importantly, the Ali Act also requires that bout information be provided to the State Attorney General upon request as a means to further “discourage a promoter from engaging in unfair or unsavory business dealings” (Varney, 2009, p. 292).

Varney’s work explains how the Ali Act would benefit MMA fighters. For example, boxing matches on Indian reservations must follow Ali Act regulations. MMA matches on Indian reservations are entitled much more leeway, often allowing for matches without proper medical testing and unequal matchmaking (e.g., unreasonable weight differences between fighters).

Furthermore, Varney argues that arbitrary/subjective enhanced bonuses provided to select fighters by MMA promotions would be lessened if these financial rewards were properly and publicly disclosed. While these arbitrary bonuses help the selected fighters, they obviously do not help the majority of other fighters competing on respective fight cards. And being subjectively distributed, the bonuses could point to favoritism on the part of the promotion.

A properly administered Ali Act in MMA would also insure that title fights and ongoing employment were based on objective rankings (which would be based on fight records and opponents fought). This would help prevent deserving fighters from being released or “buried” by promotions if they expressed disagreement with certain managerial practices. And finally, a properly enforced Ali Act in MMA would standardize minimum bout agreements.

Of course, even if the Ali Act was applied to MMA, it would change nothing unless it was enforced. Title IX is a perfect example. While Title IX mandated gender equity across all sectors of educational institutions, its impact was not felt until universities began enforcing it. Enforcement for Title IX only came with threatened legal action. In MMA, fighters currently lack the power and solidarity to take such action.

Federalization and Unionization

Fighters could be empowered if MMA was legally sanctioned in all 50 states, and done so in standardized form. Maher (2010) worries that because some states currently regulate MMA with stricter guidelines than others, MMA promotions (particularly those on the fiscal bubble) may “race to the bottom” by holding events in states where regulations are the most relaxed (i.e., cheapest), thereby increasing the risk to fighters. This could also apply on Indian reservations, where regulations appear the most lenient and least costly economically for promotions.

Unionization is also relevant here. Maher writes, “Existing state regulation does little to regulate the terms of the deals between promoters, managers, and fighters…. Like laborers elsewhere, MMA athletes face significant bargaining disadvantages relative to promoters, in terms of financial and legal resources, education, and alternative employment” (p. 41).

A fighters union could help push for minimum compensation and other worker rights, such as extended health insurance and initial planning into some kind of pension plan. The alternative outlook is increased numbers of aged-out veterans who continue to fight paycheck-to-paycheck, snared in by the sport’s onerous fiscal structure (see for example, Jonathan Snowden’s recent piece on Jens Pulver).

A drive towards unionization, however, cannot materialize until a number of other legal conditions are ironed out. As Maher explains, if MMA fighters are considered independent contractors, as opposed to company employees, unionization is not an option. However, when fighters are under exclusive promotional contracts (meaning they cannot fight for another organization) and are engaged in “an essential part of the [promoter’s] normal operations” (p. 43) (i.e., fighting), fighters stand a good chance of being defined as employees, who could then advocate for unionization.

What does the future pose for fighter rights in MMA?

Maher (2010) speculates that fans may be inclined to see increased federal regulation since our current economic crisis is blamed heavily on a lack of federal oversight. Previously, I noted that most fans would not seriously support fighter rights since improved fighter rights means higher company costs, and in turn, higher costs for fans to watch MMA, and I believe this to still be the case.

In the era of Obama and the President’s extremely minor push towards expanded health care (Clinton’s health care reform proposal was actually stronger), the conservative backlash to federal regulation has been extremely strong. Coupled with the ongoing economic crisis, bank bailouts, and high unemployment rates, the American public’s frustration with “big government” continues to fester. Unfortunately, if calls for government to “stay out of our lives” continues, this allows the free market to run unchecked, leaving the average worker with less leverage, and fighters more exploitable.

That is unless, someone, somewhere, with significant influence takes action.

Non-internet References:

Maher, B. S. (2010). Understanding and regulating the sport of mixed martial arts. Hastings Communication & Entertainment Law Journal, 1-43.

Spencer, D. C. (2009). Habit(us), body techniques and body callusing: an ethnography of mixed martial arts. Body & Society, 15 (4), 119-143.

Varney, G. (2009). Fighting for respect: MMA’s struggle for acceptance and how the Muhammad Ali Act would give it a sporting chance. West Virginia Law Review, 112, 269-305.


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